Source:Fleming-braddocks-end/content
IT WAS shown last week in this history how wide is the range of historic research opened by the name Braddock and his contemporary and countryman, Sir Peter Halket. One can take any officer of distinction who served in Braddock's army and follow his career through stirring events.
Gage, Gates, Gladwyn, Morgan and Mercer are conspicuous examples, not to mention Washington. Mercer has been written of in this series because we have Mercer street in his honor and Mercer county nearby.
We may add to the previous history that he was engaged as a surgeon in the last battle fought on the soil of Great Britain, Culloden, in 1746, on the side of the "Young Pretender," and after his defeat Mercer escaped to America and settled in Virginia. He was also with Gen. John Armstrong at the capture and destruction of Kittanning, October 7, 1756, where both he and Armstrong were wounded—and we have him firmly fixed in Pittsburgh history as the first commander at Fort Pitt, left in command by Forbes, December 4, 1758. He was a surgeon in Braddock's army also.
The battle on the Monongahela was fought on the last day of Duquesne's term of office. The next day the celebrated Pierre Francois Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, assumed the duties of governor of New France. This was July 10, 1755.
Vaudreuil was troubled. There was cause for it.
News Travels Slowly.
He wrote De Machault that very day a long letter from Quebec. One paragraph reads:
I had the honor to inform you that I should order 400 men whom I would take from Presqu'isle, to fall back on Niagara but the danger to which Fort Duquesne is exposed has caused me to change my mind.
The danger to Fort Duquesne was then over. Yet Vaudreuil had not heard the news on July 24, for on that day he wrote again, quite at length, to Machault, this time from Montreal. He began:
My Lord: I had the honor to report to you in my letters of the 2d and 10th of this month, the sad condition of the Colony; that it was so much the more surprising to, as it was quite unexpected by me relying on the assurance which the Marquis Duquesne had given me that the government was quiet, that he had provided against everything and that there was not a semblance of any movement on the part of the English.
When Braddock's battle was fought there had been no declaration of war, and none for months later, May 26, 1756. Hostilities had been going on all that time. We find Vaudreuil writing a few days after the last letter:
Fort Duquesne is really threatened. On the 7th of this month the English were within 6 or 8 leagues of it; I am informed by letter that they number 3000, being provided with artillery and other munitions for a siege.
I would not be uneasy about this fort if the officer had all these forces, they consist of about 1000 men, including regulars, militia and Indians, with which he would be in condition to form parties sufficiently considerable to annoy the march of the English from the first moment he had any knowledge thereof; these parties would have harassed, and assuredly repulsed them. Everything was in our favor in this regard, and affording us a very considerable advantage.
Provisions Are Short.
But unfortunately no foresight had been employed to supply that fort with provisions and munitions of war, so that the Commandant, being in want of one and the other, is obliged to employ the major portion of his men in making journeys to and fro for the purpose of transporting those provisions and munitions which cannot even reach him in abundance, in consequence of the delay at the Presqu'isle portage and the lowness of the water in the River Au Boeuf.
I must observe that Fort Duquesne has never been completed; on the contrary, 'tis open to many defects as is proved by the annexed plan.
It seems strange to read these statements written 15 days after the battle on the Monongahela. News had to be sent by courier and Quebec is far away. Presque Isle, as we write it, is at Erie.
The French elide the final vowel before another. Au Boeuf was French Creek; the portage from Erie to its headwaters. Machault was the minister of marine and the colonies at Paris.
By the middle of August the news of the great victory had reached the government, for on August 16 Baron de Dieskau wrote Commissary Doreil from Montreal. Among other news he writes:
The defeat of the English on the Ohio and especially the death of Gen. Bradok, who has been killed, must have furiously deranged their plans, and I calculate on deranging them still a trifle more, provided they hold on.
M. de Vandreuil [sic] is getting a translation made of all the letters taken on the defeat of the English General on the Ohio. They have had their General and 1,500 killed and all their artillery captured. These letters will be sent to Court on the re-return [sic] of my expedition.
Letters from Stobo.
Dieskau, a Saxon, in rank a major general in French service, was so severely wounded at Lake George September 8, 1755, that he never recovered. It is evident Dieskau was extravagant in his figures and we know he failed in his prediction.
Among the letters spoken of were those from Capt. Robert Stobo revealing the weakness of Fort Duquesne and urging an immeditae [sic] expedition against it furnishing the well-known map of the fort often printed.
Delays were dangerous in this campaign and the ultimate results appalling. The war whoop and scalp halloo of the savages were heard as far east as Nazareth and Bethlehem—within 50 miles of Philadelphia.
Vandreuil [sic] need not have been troubled if he had only known. Afterward he had trouble enough. When he wrote the letters above, Fort Duquesne was as safe as Quebec.
Washington's part in this astounding battle is often reverted to and showed him the real soldier. Washington, very ill, had been left behind under the care of Dr. Craik and came up on the evening of the 8th with a hundred men convoying provisions and pack horses which he had joined on July 3.
Washington was hauled in a covered wagon. On the day of the battle he had ridden on a pillow, so enfeebled was he from his attack of fever. He formed and covered the retreat, and at night rode miles to find Dunbar for wagons, provisions and hospital stores. His journey lasted all night in rain and darkness, and he reached Dunbar at daybreak.
Washington's Letter.
Washington remained at Fort Cumberland for a few days, being in feeble health and still suffering from the effects of his illness. While here he wrote the following letter to Gov. Dinwiddie of Virginia:
Fort Cumberland, July 18, 1755.
Honorable Sir:
As I am favored with an opportunity, I should think myself inexcusable were I to omit giving you some account of our late action with the French on the Monongahela, the 9th instant. We conducted our march from Fort Cumberland to Frazer's, which is about seven miles from Fort Duquesne, without meeting any extraordinary event, having only a straggler or two picked up by the French Indians. When we came to this place we were attacked (very unexpectedly I must own) by about 300 French and Indians. Our number consisted of about 1,300 chosen men, well armed, chiefly regulars who were immediately struck with such a deadly panic that nothing but confusion and disobedience of orders prevailed among them. The officers in general behaved with incomparable bravery, for which they greatly suffered, there being nearly 60 killed and wounded, a large proportion out of the number we had.
Our poor Virginians behaved like men and died like soldiers, for I believe out of three companies that were there that day scarce 30 were left alive. Captain Polson shared almost as hard a fate, for only one of his escaped; in short the dastardly behavior of the English soldiers exposed all those that were inclined to do their duty to almost certain death, and at length, in despite of every effort, broke and ran like sheep before the hounds, leaving the artillery, ammunition and provisions and every individual thing amongst us as a prey for the enemy; and when we endeavored to rally them, in hopes of regaining our invaluable loss it was with as much success as if we had attempted to stop wild boars on the mountains.
The General was wounded behind the shoulder and in the breast, of which he died the third day after. His two aides-de-camp were both wounded, but are in a fair way of recovery. Col. Burton and Sir John Sinclair were also wounded, and I hope will get over it.
Sir Peter Halket, with many other brave officers, was killed on the field. I luckily escaped without a wound, though I had four bullets through my coat and two horses shot under me.
British Are Denounced.
It is supposed we left 300 or more dead on the field; about that number we brought off wounded, and it is imagined, with great notice, too, that two-thirds of both these numbers received their shots from our own cowardly dogs of soldiers who gathered themselves into a body, contrary to orders, 10 or 12 deep; would then level and fire and shoot down the men before them.
I tremble at the consequence this defeat may have on the back inhabitants, who I suppose will all leave their habitations unless proper measures are taken for their security. Col. Dunbar, who commands at present, intends as soon as his men are recruited at this place, to continue his march to Philadelphia into winter quarters, so that there will be none left here unless the poor remains of the Virginia troops who now are and will be too small to guard our frontier.
As Capt. Orme is now writing to your Honor, I doubt not that he will give you a circumstantial account of all things which will make it needless for me to add more.
Washington arrived home at Mt. Vernon on July 26. Dunbar left for England in November.
We have no Dunbar street. We have a town of that name. It is a name that stands for perfidy and not to be esteemed however historic. If one wants to be alliterative he can put it Dunbar, dastard and dolt; Braddock, brave and bigoted.
It is interesting to read what historians say of Braddock. Let us take Carlyle for one and listen to his staccata [sic] tones.
He says ("History of Frederick the Great."):
July 8th, Braddock crossing the Monongahela without hindrance. July 9th was within 10 miles of Fort Duquesne; plodding along; marching through a wood, when—ambuscade of French and Indians burst on him. French with defenses in front and store of squatted Indians on each flank,—who at once blew him to destruction; him and his Enterprise both. His men behaved very ill; sensible perhaps they were not led very well. Wednesday, 9th July, 1755, about three in the afternoon. His two regiments gave one volley and no more; utterly terror-struck by the novelty, by the misguidance, at Preston Pans before; shot, it was whispered, several of their own officers, who were furiously rallying them with word and sword; out of sixty officers only five were not killed.
Wounding of Braddock.
Brave men clad in soldier's uniforms, victims of military chaos, and miraculous nescience, in themselves and others: Can there be a more distressing spectacle?
Mere opinion, Thomas, are they. He proceeds:
Braddock, refusing to fall back as advised, had five horses shot under him; was himself shot, in the arm, in the breast; was carried off the field in a death stupor—forward all night, next day and next (to Fort Cumberland, seventy miles to rear);—and on the fourth day died. The Colonial Militias had stood their ground. Col. Washington now of some use again;—who were ranked well to the rearward; and able to receive the ambuscade as an open fight. Stood striving for about three hours. And would have saved the retreat; had there been a retreat, instead of a panic rout, to save.
The poor General,—ebbing homewards, he and his Enterprise, hour after hour,—roused himself twice only, for a moment, from his death stupor; once, the first night, to ejaculate mournfully, "Who would have thought it?" And again once, he was heard to say, days after, in a tone of hope, "Next time we will do better!" which were his last words, death following in a few minutes.
Weary, heavy-laden soul; deep Sleep now descending on it,—soft, sweet cataracts of Sleep and Rest; suggesting hope, and triumph over sorrow, after all: "Another time we will do better," and in a few minutes was dead.
Braddock Defended.
But Braddock has had some eulogists and some softened tones can be heard. Washington said of him:
Thus died a man whose good and bad qualities were intimately blended. His attachments were warm and there was no disguise about him. He was brave even to a fault.
Washington Irving observes:
Braddock's melancholly end too, disarms censure of its asperity. Whatever may have been his faults and errors, he in a manner expiated them by the hardest fate that can befall a brave soldier ambitious of renown; an unknown grave in a strange land; a memory clouded by misfortune; and a name forever coupled with defeat.
Braddock's defeat had two effects; one immediately bad; from the other came good years later.
First, the defeat inspired the Indians with contempt for the English soldiers and respect for the military ability of the French. The neutral tribes who had wavered no longer did so, but came over to the French. They began to regard their own prowess with unbounded complacency and days of woe followed for the colonists.
The second effect, wherein the defeat was not a misfortune, lay in the wide-open fact that the English army was not invincible. The American colonist lost his reverence for the English soldier. Henceforth there came always in mind the action of that soldier on the banks of the Monongahela and the measure of his worth was taken accordingly.
When the shots rang out in 1775 that were heard around the world the American despised a British redcoat as much as he did a redskin. Otherwise there might have been no American Revolution.
Query—Did the calamity of July 9, 1755, contribute to our independence? Awful in the true sense as it was, can we in any way reconcile it as a benefit to the American people?
Some history, believe us, happened hereabouts.
Maj. Patrick Mackellar, who afterward attained distinction at Quebec, accompanied Braddock as engineer with Robert Gordon and one Williamson as assistants. All three were wounded.
It is remarkable that amid the turmoil and panic of that terrible day they were able to make the maps which are still available.
Parkman, who has used everything pertaining to this history, reproduces them in his work "Montcalm and Wolfe."
These plans were used and enlarged after actual surveys by Sydney Dillon, chief engineer for the Edgar Thomson Steel Works at Braddock, and a number of blue-prints were issued, copies of which can be seen in the Carnegie libraries in Braddock and Schenley Park. The scale on map No. 1 he made 600 feet to the inch with contours approximate and they were published in February, 1909. Mr. Dillon followed Mackellar's key with the exception that on the blue-prints the British are indicated by red squares and the French and Indians by yellow circles.
A statement accompanies the maps, to-wit:
The location of the battlefield and road shown is based upon a study of the ground in connection with the two maps made by Pat'k Mackellar, engineer with Braddock's army, and the plan from Winsor's "Narrative and Critical History of the United States," Vol. V, P. 499, and the Carnegie McCandless Company's property map of 1873, showing contours of the bottom land in the vicinity of the road.
Map No. 2 is a plan of the boroughs of Braddock and North Braddock, showing location of the field of battle of July 9, 1755, inscribed as before except a note stating that this map corresponds to Mackellar's map No. 2, with scale as before, and contours approximate and published at the same time. In 1873 the Carnegie McCandless Company owned the Edgar Thomson works.
Of the many thousands who daily travel beyond Braddock on the Pennsylvania Railroad an interesting enumeration would be the number of those who realize they are passing directly through the scene of the terrible carnage of July 9, 1755.
Notes of Map Maker.
For the purpose of illustrating the ground Mackellar's maps as printed by Parkman are presented, and the references also, and afterwards apportioned to the present locus, that is, as we know the ground.
The following notes are from Mackellar's map No. 1, entitled:
A sketch of the Field of Battle of July 9th upon the Monongahela seven miles from Fort Du Quesne, showing the Disposition of the Troops when the Action began.
It is obvious Mackellar's reference characters must be described. The paralellograms [sic] indicate British troops, the long lines expressing the number of files. Small circles show French and Indians; black crosses, cannon and howitzers; square with a short vertical line on the top, wagons, carts and tumbrils; the heavy letter I, cattle and pack horses. Mackellar's verbatim references are:
A, French and Indian when first discovered by the Guides.
B, Guides and six light Horse.
C, Vanguard of the Advanced Party.
D, Advanced Party commanded by Lt. Col. Gage.
E, Working Party commanded by Sir John St. Clair.
F, Two Field Pieces.
G, Waggons with Powder and Tools.
H, Rear Guard of Advanced Party.
I, (light letter) Light Horse leading the Convoy.
K, Sailors and Pioneers with a Tumbril of Tools, etc.
L, Three Field Pieces.
M, The General's Guard.
N, Main Body upon the Flanks of the Convoy, with the Cattle and Pack Horses between them and the Flank Guard.
O, Field Piece in ye Rear of ye Convoy.
P, Rear Guards.
Q, Flank Guards.
R, A Hollow Way.
S, A Hill which the French and Indians did much of their Execution from.
T, Frazier's Horse [sic].
The tumbrils were two-wheeled carts conveying tools, etc.
Mackellar's map No. 2 is entitled:
A sketch of the Field of Battle showing the disposition of the troops about 2 o'clock when the whole of the main body had joined the advanced and working partys, then beat back from the ground they occupied as in plan No. 1.
How Fight Ended.
His notes are as follows:
A, French and Indians skulking behind Trees round the British.
B, Two Field Pieces of advanced Party abandoned.
C, D, E, H, K, M, N, Q, Whole body of British joined with little or no Order; but endeavoring to make Fronts towards Ye Enemies Fire.
L, The 3 Field Pieces of the Main Body.
P, Rear Guard divided (round rear of Convoy now closed up) behind Trees having been attacked by a few Indians.
N. B. The Disposition on both Sides continued about two hours nearly as here represented, the British endeavoring to recover the guns (F) and to gain the Hill (S) to no purpose. The British were at length beat from the Guns (L). The General was wounded soon after. They were at last beat across the Hollow Way (R) and made no further stand. The Retreat was full of Confusion and Hurry, but after a few Miles there was a Body got to rally.
With reference to present topography the first map shows that the British left was at the Pennsylvania Railroad and Corey avenue, the right at the river and Turtle Creek at Frazier's, the convoy spread out from this point as far west as Thirteenth street. The "Hollow Way" is just beyond Braddock Station on the Pennsylvania Railroad. The British advance got as far north as Kirkpatrick avenue and Corey street in North Braddock borough.
The French and Indians were massed on the south side of the railroad about Copeland Station, the main body of the British were north of the present line of the Pennsylvania tracks.
The second map shows the British huddled about Braddock Station of that road, perhaps slightly above, surrounded on three sides, with an open way to the east. The convoys are shown at the railroad in front of the furnaces, a few Indians are on their left flank; French and Indians on right flank (though scattered) as far east as Bessemer Station, with skulking parties behind trees endeavoring to entirely surround the British.
The veriest "rookey" that ever wore the blue uniform of our Uncle Sam could ask as he studies these plans:
"Why didn't Gen. Braddock call for an orderly and say: 'Tell Lieut. Smith to bring his battery forward and go up on that hill (Kennywood) and throw a few shells across the river into those woods till we see what's in them?'"
And then a strong skirmish line well deployed—good cover in those woods—could have held back an army—for a time anyhow.
At the time of the battle Frazier's house was deserted. From there it was eight miles to Fort Duquesne by a rough path.
Mackellar was with Gage in the advance. Parkman says his map was never fully approved by the chief officers, presumably Gage and Burton, but it does correspond closely to one made by Capt. Orme, whose plan, the last of six, was engraved in 1758 and published by Jeffreys in his work, "General Topography of North America and the West Indies," London, 1768. This work contains a plan of Fort Duquesne also. Jeffreys calls it "le Quesne."
